Some S.K. with yer Kaffee
i have had for a while this funny vision-- my pet daydream-- of having a discussion group on some of Soren Kierkegaard's material. Problem is, the only folks nutty enough to leave their warm homes and meet with me in a seedy locale to wade through some of earth's more complicated (and enjoyable, if i may say it) syntactical loop-the-loops, convoluted exposés, and flat-out funny ironies are unshaven chain-smoking "philosophers" who, in the face of an ocean of social repercussions, insist on wearing sleeveless V-neck pullovers. And in spite of the fact (or because of it, as the case may be) that i couldn't possibly care any less what a single one of them might think, i'm confident (from rather a lot of experience) that they tend to have very different motives for their reading than i. So, since i have noone with whom i could get together and have a formal discussion group and bible-study, and since i might be able to talk 20-25% of my readership (depending on whether i have 4 or 5 readers) into actually picking up the books, i thought i'd just liberally poach and reprint big swaths of material from the Princeton Press editions.*
Grasping SK's writing style is sometimes labor-intensive (at least for me)-- he invented, and, to at least some degree formalized his own system of punctuation in order to say what he wanted to say. i've seen entire-page-long sentences without break, parentheses within parentheses, sentences with multiple colons, long parenthetical thoughts with footnotes, and footnotes with parentheses. There may even be some footnotes with footnotes. Moreover, all of his stuff (that i can read, at any rate) is translated from Danish, and translation (i.e., the translator) generally adds another level of verbosity to the mix. But i've found that following SK's cords through the knot to the other end is almost always worthwhile. Sometimes i'll read the same section several times and end up with whole pages underlined, but in stages across the readings. i hope you'll take the time and spend the energy to understand what he says whether you agree with him or not. i look forward to your thoughts.
It isn't my intent to delve very far into SK's history (although it's very colorful and i'd recommend doing so yourself) or even to heavily cross-reference within his own writing, except as it seems necessary for clarity (much of his stuff-- especially his earlier writings-- were written pseudonomously with personalities and beliefs intentionally very different from his own.) It's my belief that he had a profound impact on Dietrich Bonhoeffer's theology much later, and he certainly influenced the thoughts of myriad other thinkers, but for the most part his writings stand without need of apology or the larger context in which they're written. More generally, it isn't my intent to give some sort of "primer" to Kierkegaard at all (go ahead and let out your big sigh of relief, scoffer) or even to pique your interest in him. Rather, i've found that some of the stuff he's written has left such a deep mark on my own thinking that i'd like to toss some of it out to you and see if there's any effect.
Because of the formatting problem i usually get publishing to my blog, and to maintain ease of reading, i'll use a different font to set off quoted material, rather than the standard indentation/ size change. Any square-bracketed material is the translators' clarification exactly as published; anything i have to interject, i'll add as a footnote. (Hong frequently also adds the original Danish word in brackets when it might help the reader get the meaning better, or when a word-play of some sort was intended that doesn't translate well. These i'll omit.) The following is from "Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments," from the second part of the book on the Christian as subject as opposed to an objective observer. Lately i've done a lot of raging because of what feels to me like a long, continuous run of simple bad luck, and this bit spoke to me loudly.
The world-historical idea increasingly concentrates everything systematically. What a Sophist once said, that he could carry the whole world in a nutshell, now seems to be accomplished in modern surveys of world history: they are becoming more and more compendious. It is not my intention to point out the comic in this. However, through various thoughts leading to the same goal, I shall attempt to clarify what ethics and the ethical object to in this entire order of things. In our day, it is not a matter of a particular scholar's or thinker's occupying himself with world history; no, the whole age is clamoring for world history. Yet ethics and the ethical, by being the essential stronghold of individual existence, have an irrefutable claim upon every existing individual, an irrefutable claim of such a nature that whatever a person achieves in the world, even the most amazing thing, is nevertheless dubious if he himself has not been ethically clear when he chose and has not made his choice ethically clear to himself. The ethical quality is jealous of itself and spurns the most amazing quantity.
Therefore ethics looks with a suspicious eye at all world-historical knowledge, because this easily becomes a trap, a demoralizing esthetic diversion for the knowing subject, because the distinction between what does and does not become world-historical is quantitative-dialectical. That is also why the absolute ethical distinction between good and evil is world-historically-esthetically neutralized in the esthetic-metaphysical category of "the great," "the momentous," to which the bad and the good have equal access. In the world-historical, an essential role is played by factors of another kind, different from the ethical-dialectical: namely, the accidental, circumstances, that play of forces in which the reshaping totality of historical life absorbs the individual's action in order to transform it into something different that does not directly belong to him. Neither by willing the good to the utmost of his ability nor by willing evil with diabolical collousness is a person assured of becoming world-historical; even in the case of misfortune, it holds true that it takes luck to become world-historical. How, then, does an individual become world-historical? Ethically viewed, he becomes world-historical by accident. But ethics also considers unethical the transition whereby a person abandons the ethical quality in order to try his hand, cravingly, wishfully, etc., at the quantifying other.
An age and a person can be immoral in various ways, but it is also immoral or at least a temptation to consort too much with world history, a temptation that can easily lead a person to want also to be world-historical when the time comes that he himself is going to act. By continually being occupied as an observer of the accidental, that accessorium [addition] by which world-historical figures become world-historical, a person is easily misled into confusing this accessorium with the ethical and easily misled, unhealthily, flirtingly, and cowardly, to being concerned about the accidental, instead, himself existing, of being infinitely concerned about the ethical. Perhaps the reason our age is dissatisfied when it is going to act is that it has been coddled by observing. That is perhaps why there are so many fruitless attempts to become something more than one is by lumping together socially in the hope of impressing the spirit of history numerically. Spoiled by constant association with world history, people want the momentous and only that, are concerned only with the accidental, the world-historical outcome, instead of being concerned with the essential, the innermost, freedom, the ethical.
In other words, continual association with the world-historical makes a person incompetent to act. True ethical enthusiasm consists in willing to the utmost of one's capability, but also, uplifted in divine jest, in never thinking whether or not one thereby achieves something. As soon as the will begins to cast a covetous eye on the outcome, the individual begins to become immoral-- the energy of the will becomes torpid, or develops abnormally into an unhealthy, unethical, mercenary hankering that, even if it achieves something great, does not achieve it ethically-- the individual demands something other than the ethical itself. A truly great ethical individuality would consummate his life as follows: he would develop himself to the utmost of his capability; in the process he perhaps would produce a great effect in the external world, but this would not occupy him at all, because he would know that the external is not in his power and therefore means nothing either pro or contra....
In other words, if a person cannot by his own efforts, in freedom, by willing the good, become a world-historical figure-- which is impossible precisely because it is only possible, that is, perhaps possible, that is, dependent on something else-- then it is unethical to be concerned about it. And when, instead of renouncing this concern and tearing himself loose from its temptation, a person prinks it up with the pious appearance of benefiting others, he is immoral and wants sneakily to insinuate into his account with God the thought that God nevertheless does need him just a little bit. But this is obtuseness, for God needs no human being. How highly embarrassing to be Creator if it turned out that God came to need the creature. On the contrary, God can require everything of every human being, everything and for nothing, since every human being is an unworthy servant, and the ethically inspired person is different from others only in knowing this and in hating and loathing all deception.
*Fear not: i'll roughly cite my sources. All of the quoted matter is from Howard and Edna Hong's translations and arrangements of Soren Kierkegaard's writings.
1 Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, trans. and ed. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992), 133-37.
Grasping SK's writing style is sometimes labor-intensive (at least for me)-- he invented, and, to at least some degree formalized his own system of punctuation in order to say what he wanted to say. i've seen entire-page-long sentences without break, parentheses within parentheses, sentences with multiple colons, long parenthetical thoughts with footnotes, and footnotes with parentheses. There may even be some footnotes with footnotes. Moreover, all of his stuff (that i can read, at any rate) is translated from Danish, and translation (i.e., the translator) generally adds another level of verbosity to the mix. But i've found that following SK's cords through the knot to the other end is almost always worthwhile. Sometimes i'll read the same section several times and end up with whole pages underlined, but in stages across the readings. i hope you'll take the time and spend the energy to understand what he says whether you agree with him or not. i look forward to your thoughts.
It isn't my intent to delve very far into SK's history (although it's very colorful and i'd recommend doing so yourself) or even to heavily cross-reference within his own writing, except as it seems necessary for clarity (much of his stuff-- especially his earlier writings-- were written pseudonomously with personalities and beliefs intentionally very different from his own.) It's my belief that he had a profound impact on Dietrich Bonhoeffer's theology much later, and he certainly influenced the thoughts of myriad other thinkers, but for the most part his writings stand without need of apology or the larger context in which they're written. More generally, it isn't my intent to give some sort of "primer" to Kierkegaard at all (go ahead and let out your big sigh of relief, scoffer) or even to pique your interest in him. Rather, i've found that some of the stuff he's written has left such a deep mark on my own thinking that i'd like to toss some of it out to you and see if there's any effect.
Because of the formatting problem i usually get publishing to my blog, and to maintain ease of reading, i'll use a different font to set off quoted material, rather than the standard indentation/ size change. Any square-bracketed material is the translators' clarification exactly as published; anything i have to interject, i'll add as a footnote. (Hong frequently also adds the original Danish word in brackets when it might help the reader get the meaning better, or when a word-play of some sort was intended that doesn't translate well. These i'll omit.) The following is from "Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments," from the second part of the book on the Christian as subject as opposed to an objective observer. Lately i've done a lot of raging because of what feels to me like a long, continuous run of simple bad luck, and this bit spoke to me loudly.
The world-historical idea increasingly concentrates everything systematically. What a Sophist once said, that he could carry the whole world in a nutshell, now seems to be accomplished in modern surveys of world history: they are becoming more and more compendious. It is not my intention to point out the comic in this. However, through various thoughts leading to the same goal, I shall attempt to clarify what ethics and the ethical object to in this entire order of things. In our day, it is not a matter of a particular scholar's or thinker's occupying himself with world history; no, the whole age is clamoring for world history. Yet ethics and the ethical, by being the essential stronghold of individual existence, have an irrefutable claim upon every existing individual, an irrefutable claim of such a nature that whatever a person achieves in the world, even the most amazing thing, is nevertheless dubious if he himself has not been ethically clear when he chose and has not made his choice ethically clear to himself. The ethical quality is jealous of itself and spurns the most amazing quantity.
Therefore ethics looks with a suspicious eye at all world-historical knowledge, because this easily becomes a trap, a demoralizing esthetic diversion for the knowing subject, because the distinction between what does and does not become world-historical is quantitative-dialectical. That is also why the absolute ethical distinction between good and evil is world-historically-esthetically neutralized in the esthetic-metaphysical category of "the great," "the momentous," to which the bad and the good have equal access. In the world-historical, an essential role is played by factors of another kind, different from the ethical-dialectical: namely, the accidental, circumstances, that play of forces in which the reshaping totality of historical life absorbs the individual's action in order to transform it into something different that does not directly belong to him. Neither by willing the good to the utmost of his ability nor by willing evil with diabolical collousness is a person assured of becoming world-historical; even in the case of misfortune, it holds true that it takes luck to become world-historical. How, then, does an individual become world-historical? Ethically viewed, he becomes world-historical by accident. But ethics also considers unethical the transition whereby a person abandons the ethical quality in order to try his hand, cravingly, wishfully, etc., at the quantifying other.
An age and a person can be immoral in various ways, but it is also immoral or at least a temptation to consort too much with world history, a temptation that can easily lead a person to want also to be world-historical when the time comes that he himself is going to act. By continually being occupied as an observer of the accidental, that accessorium [addition] by which world-historical figures become world-historical, a person is easily misled into confusing this accessorium with the ethical and easily misled, unhealthily, flirtingly, and cowardly, to being concerned about the accidental, instead, himself existing, of being infinitely concerned about the ethical. Perhaps the reason our age is dissatisfied when it is going to act is that it has been coddled by observing. That is perhaps why there are so many fruitless attempts to become something more than one is by lumping together socially in the hope of impressing the spirit of history numerically. Spoiled by constant association with world history, people want the momentous and only that, are concerned only with the accidental, the world-historical outcome, instead of being concerned with the essential, the innermost, freedom, the ethical.
In other words, continual association with the world-historical makes a person incompetent to act. True ethical enthusiasm consists in willing to the utmost of one's capability, but also, uplifted in divine jest, in never thinking whether or not one thereby achieves something. As soon as the will begins to cast a covetous eye on the outcome, the individual begins to become immoral-- the energy of the will becomes torpid, or develops abnormally into an unhealthy, unethical, mercenary hankering that, even if it achieves something great, does not achieve it ethically-- the individual demands something other than the ethical itself. A truly great ethical individuality would consummate his life as follows: he would develop himself to the utmost of his capability; in the process he perhaps would produce a great effect in the external world, but this would not occupy him at all, because he would know that the external is not in his power and therefore means nothing either pro or contra....
In other words, if a person cannot by his own efforts, in freedom, by willing the good, become a world-historical figure-- which is impossible precisely because it is only possible, that is, perhaps possible, that is, dependent on something else-- then it is unethical to be concerned about it. And when, instead of renouncing this concern and tearing himself loose from its temptation, a person prinks it up with the pious appearance of benefiting others, he is immoral and wants sneakily to insinuate into his account with God the thought that God nevertheless does need him just a little bit. But this is obtuseness, for God needs no human being. How highly embarrassing to be Creator if it turned out that God came to need the creature. On the contrary, God can require everything of every human being, everything and for nothing, since every human being is an unworthy servant, and the ethically inspired person is different from others only in knowing this and in hating and loathing all deception.
When a headstrong person is battling with his contemporaries and endures it all but also shouts, "Posterity, history will surely make manifest that I spoke the truth," then people believe that he is inspired. Alas, no, he is just a bit smarter than the utterly obtuse people. He does not choose money and the prettiest girl or the like; he chooses world-historical importance-- yes, he know very well what he is choosing. But in relation to God and the ethical, he is a deceitful lover; he is also one of those for whom Judas became a guide (Acts 1:16)-- he, too, is selling his relationship with God, though not for money. And although he perhaps reforms an entire age through his zeal and teaching, he confounds existence pro virili [to the very extent of his powers], because his own form of existence is not adequate to his teaching, because by excepting himself he establishes a teleology that renders existence meaningless. 1
*Fear not: i'll roughly cite my sources. All of the quoted matter is from Howard and Edna Hong's translations and arrangements of Soren Kierkegaard's writings.
1 Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, trans. and ed. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992), 133-37.
Labels: Kierkegaard
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